This paper aims to estimate the impact of school-based management (SBM) on students' test scores in the Philippines. Estimation results using double differencing combined with propensity score matching shows that SBM increases the average national achievement test score by 4.2 points over three years. The increase in mathematics reached 5.7 score points. Triple differencing procedure using the pre-intervention period as the baseline provides even larger impact estimates: 8.6 and 11.4 points for the average and mathematics scores, respectively. The impacts are larger than the estimate previously reported from the Philippines, probably due to the fact that the sample schools had learned about SBM implementation from experiences accumulated in other provinces that introduced SBM earlier. The empirical results also show that schools with experienced principals and teachers are eager to introduce SBM.
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Introduction
School-based management (SBM) aims to introduce an autonomous school governance to reflect local needs with direct monitoring of school activities by their stakeholders, parents, and the community.
Such a decentralization effort in the context of school education includes some of the following features:
decentralized revenue generation, school administration, management, teacher hiring, and curriculum design. 1 These functions have devolved to local governments or schools. In this paper, I assess the impacts of SBM on students' achievements, measured by their national achievement test scores, using school-level data available from the second round of SBM scale-up in the Philippines.
There were two stages of SBM implementation in the Philippines, where the empirical study of this paper is drawn. Improvement Plans (AIPs) in order to receive the SBM grant. Schools are required to set up SIPs for the next five years as well as more specific AIPs that describe their plans for one school year. SBM grants were allocated to schools based on the relevance of their SIPs and AIPs. Therefore, a three-year gap in the improvement plans is assumed between the two groups. A matching method is used to control for pre-SBM differences, correlated with the non-randomness of SBM implementation between the two groups in the sample. This paper is closely related to an earlier study by Khattr et al. (2012) , who used the initial implementation stage of SBM during the TEEP period, when the government had initially planned three batches by divisions to implement SBM (thus, enabling a pipeline method). Their empirical setting is characterized by two important features: (i) in reality, lags between batches were short for reasons related to the actual project implementation, and (ii) it was at the very initial stage of SBM in the Philippines. Khattr et al. (2012) estimated an increase of 1.45 points in the total test scores from a two-year exposure to SBM. Yamauchi and Liu (2013) evaluated the impact of the whole intervention package of TEEP (including SBM) on test scores. Their analysis did not attempt to purge SBM impacts from the other components, so the impact estimate included the SBM impacts. The estimation used a sample of schools from the macroregion of Visayas, where treated and control divisions are geographically scattered. Based on double differences, combined with propensity score matching, the impact is around an increased score of 4.5 to 5 points over two years.
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This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews recent literature on SBM. Section 3 describes the empirical setting, especially TEEP and non-TEEP divisions, and discusses why I restrict the sample to non-TEEP and non-city division schools. Section 4 describes the data. The data comes from three sources: (i) national school census data, (ii) SBM fund data, and (iii) national achievement test score data. Section 5 discusses the empirical method, namely double differences combined with propensity score matching.
Empirical results are summarized in Section 5. Double differencing with propensity score matching shows that SBM increases the national achievement test scores by 4.2 points over three years.
The mathematics score increased by 5.7 points. Triple differencing estimates (with propensity score matching) show even larger estimates of the SBM impact due to the fact that the pre-intervention trend was significantly smaller among the schools that introduced SBM in 2006. The above estimates are larger than the estimate previously reported from the Philippines, probably due to the fact that the sample schools had learned from SBM experiences accumulated in the schools that introduced SBM earlier. The empirical results also show that schools endowed with more experienced principals and teachers are likely to be well prepared for introducing SBM.
Literature Review
Recently there are a growing number of studies that evaluated the impact of SBM (see Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011, Table 3.4) . Here I collect studies that used either randomization or a combination of panel data and matching methods. The first group used randomization to identify the SBM impacts (Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer 2012; Chaudhury and Parajuli 2010; Das 2008; Pradhan et al. 2010; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rodrigues-Oreggia 2012) . With an ideal introduction of randomized trials, analysis is free from endogenous program placement that could bias the treatment effect. Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2012) introduced randomized experiments to Kenyan schools to compare school resource effects and teachers' incentive effects on learning outcomes. They found that improving school resources, measured by decreasing the pupil-teacher ratio, leads to reduced teacher effort in the absence of any other changes, but students who were assigned to locally hired contract teachers (with the presence of parents' involvement in school management) showed significant improvement in test scores. Chaudhury and Parajuli (2010) and Gertler, Patrinos and Rodrigues-Oreggia (2012) , using school-level randomized experiments in Nepal and Mexico, respectively, showed that a devolution of decision making to the school/community level improved grade progression (and reduced repetitions), but the impact on students' learning outcomes, measured by test scores, was insignificant. In Madagascar, Glewwe and Maiga (2011) and Lassibille et al. (2010) Skoufias and Shapiro (2006) evaluated the impact of increased school resources and decentralized management decisions in Mexico. They found that the reform decreased dropout, failure, and repetition rates, but the magnitude of the overall impact was small. Related to the current study, Khattr et al. (2012) used school-level test score data in the Philippines to assess the impact of SBM on learning outcomes. They showed that the introduction of SBM had a significant impact on students' test scores, but it is an increase of 1.45 points in the percent score over two years.
Background
The Philippines introduced SBM in two steps. 
Third Elementary Education Project
The . The unique feature of TEEP is its combination of investments in school facility, education materials, and school governance reform. Not only were there improvements in school facilities and supplies of textbooks, but the decision-making process was also decentralized to the school and community levels.
TEEP introduced a package of investments to schools in the selected 23 provinces, which included (1) school building construction and renovation, (2) textbooks, (3) teacher training, (4) SBM,
and (5) other facility and equipment support. Note that with the exception of principal-led projects on school building, schools or communities did not influence the initiation of the above interventions.
The TEEP program covered both primary (grades 1-4) and elementary (grades 1-6) schools.
However, converting primary schools to elementary schools by extending enrollment up to grade 6 was also an important part of the TEEP program. Students who complete primary schools are likely to attend elementary schools in grades 5 and 6, which changes the student body of those schools between grades 1 and 4 and grades 5 and 6.
SBM is an important component of TEEP because it gives schools an incentive to manage proactively and more independently of the government. Schools partnered with communities and parents to make decisions about key issues such as improvement plans and school finances. Teachers were also trained systematically to improve teaching skills. Information management is being improved so that schools are responsible for systematically organizing information on enrollment, learning achievements, and finance, among others, and reporting it to the division office. Schools are required to set improvement plans every year and compare them with actual achievement. This dynamic process is monitored by the division-level education department. School finance is also being decentralized to some extent to relax the school budget constraints because Philippine public schools are not allowed to charge school fees. TEEP schools are free to raise their own funds from communities, parents, and others, though resources are admittedly limited in many poor communities. These reforms in public schools are expected to improve education quality, which would then increase returns to schooling in labor markets (see Yamauchi 2005) .
The selection of TEEP provinces was purposive because it intended to cover the most depressed provinces identified in the Social Reform Agenda. TEEP allocation is rather different in the Philippines' three macroregions. In the northern macroregion of Luzon, TEEP was concentrated in the mountainous Cordillera Administrative Region. In the central macroregion of Visayas, TEEP divisions were relatively evenly distributed. In the southern Mindanao macroregion, TEEP divisions were clustered, though not as clustered as in northern Luzon.
Non-TEEP Schools
In this paper, I use non-TEEP divisions where SBM was introduced after 2006. SBM was scaled up to non-TEEP divisions after the completion of TEEP. However, the implementation lagged due to uneven distributions of preparedness across schools to propose concrete improvement plans. TEEP divisions were partnered with their neighboring non-TEEP divisions to introduce SBM. 6 At that time, there was not a systematic large-scale school intervention, such as TEEP, so non-TEEP schools did not receive the package of investments that TEEP provided. Therefore, for example, non-TEEP schools did not have an intervention that specifically supported teacher training. I can assume that the major change introduced in non-TEEP schools after 2006 was SBM.
As discussed below, I use two groups of schools: those schools that received SBM grants in 2006, and those that received the grant in 2009. The distinction between them is simply the lag in receiving SBM grants, which is correlated with school-level preparedness for SBM to propose SIPs (five years) and AIPs. 
Data
The analysis uses the Basic Education Information System (BEIS) database for elementary schools, national achievement test score data, and SBM grant information. They are panel data, so it is possible to estimate the effect of SBM introduction on changes in test scores, controlling for changes in school conditions.
To increase homogeneity, I restrict the sample to non-city divisions among non-TEEP divisions.
First, schools from non-city divisions are used in the analysis because there are not enough numbers of treatment and control schools within a city division (a relatively small area). Treatment and control schools are therefore compared within each division, excluding city divisions. By doing this, I can also avoid contagion effects of early SBM practitioners to latecomers in the same city. Note that students who complete primary school (grades 1 to 4) are likely to attend grade 5 at elementary schools, which alters the composition of students from grades 4 to 5. Though the introduction of SBM can change the flow of students from primary schools, the outcome measure comes from test scores of students in grade 6. Grade 6 students in 2009 who transferred at grade 5 in 2007 were exposed to SBM for two years, one year shorter than the exposure period for those who progressed in the treatment schools. The elementary schools that introduced SBM might have attracted more transferees from primary schools and/or students who otherwise were not in school, which might lead to an underestimation of the impact if those students from primary schools perform less satisfactorily in NAT than those who started from the treatment schools.
As discussed in the next section, propensity score matching is used to control the endogeneity of the SBM grant receipt in 2006 versus 2009. BEIS data in the 2005 school year are used to control for school types, total enrollment, and school resources, as measured by the pupil-classroom ratio, pupilteacher ratio, and the principal and teachers' experiences (i.e., capacity measured by salaries, correlated with their ranks).
Empirical Strategy
Because the allocation of an SBM grant (2006) 
Empirical Results
As explained, I compare schools that introduced SBM in 2006 and 2009. First, it is possible that the two groups of schools had different trends before 2006, which can be projected onto the period in First, complete and mono-grade schools were likely to receive SBM grants.
12 Second, among school resource indicators, the pupil-teacher ratio significantly increases the likelihood of receiving the grant. Total enrollment and pupil-classroom ratio are insignificant. Third, total salaries of teaching staff-the principal, head teachers, master teachers, and teachers-all significantly increase the probability of receiving SBM grant. Teachers' human capital (measured by their experience) significantly increases the likelihood of introducing SBM. Therefore, the total amount of human capital endowed among teachers as well as the number of students per teacher are crucial determinants of early stage SBM introduction. Since schools have to design good SIPs to earn SBM grants, the above finding showing the importance of teachers' human capital is sensible. Figure 1 shows the computed propensities for the treated and control groups from the first specification. As expected, its distribution of the treated first-order dominates that of the control group.
The estimated propensity was trimmed by 0.15 and 0.85 when constructing weights; very small and large propensities were dropped.
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The SBM impacts on test scores are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 . Estimation in Table 3 uses the weights constructed from the propensities estimated in logit ( Table 4 controls school factors such as changes in total enrollment, pupil-classroom ratio, pupilteacher ratio, and the total amount of teachers' salaries by position. If SBM changes school conditions through investments in school facilities, etc., the inclusion of such variables as controls may bias the impact estimate. However, it is still important to check the robustness of the main results (Table 3) by including changes in school conditions. 15 Table 4 confirms that the main findings remain robust, without any significant changes in the estimated impacts. The above results in Tables 3 and 4 show that (i) the SBM impacts on NAT are significant and relatively large, and (ii) controlling for school conditions does not affect the impact estimates. Table 5 to be inserted It is, however, still possible that other factors contributed to the above finding. For example, NAT might have become easier in recent years. If so, low-performing schools that also introduced SBM earlier were able to improve their test scores, regardless of SBM. It is also shown that the variation of NAT scores across schools has decreased in the same period consistently (Table A1) , while variations in other conventional school and teacher resource inputs have increased during the same period (Yamauchi and Parandekar 2014) . This is consistent with the observations in Table 2 as well as the findings in Tables 3   and 4 , since the average NAT score of the SBM/2006 schools caught up to that of the SBM/2009 schools, which can be attributed at least partially to the introduction of SBM.
The SBM impact estimate of 4.2 in total score can be translated into a change of pupil, teacher, or classroom ratio that is required to bring about NAT changes in the same magnitude. Table A2 shows the estimated effects of changes in pupil-teacher ratio, pupil-classroom ratio, and per-pupil teacher salary on NAT scores (using the 2005-2010 panel data). Though the estimates of the pupil-classroon ratio and the pupil-teacher ratio effects are likely subject to upward bias, 17 the results show that a change by ten students in these ratios has a much smaller effect on test scores than what the estimated impact of SBM (measured in a three-year period) indicates.
Conclusions
This paper has shown a significant SBM impact on student test scores over three years. SBM was implemented earlier among schools that have more experienced teachers but a large number of students per teacher.
The estimate of the SBM impact over three years is larger than the previous estimate from the Philippines (Khattri, Ling, and Jha 2012) . There are several reasons. First, their estimate is based on a comparison between the first and second batch schools, scheduled during TEEP. In reality, however, interventions to the two groups occurred almost simultaneously. Second, TEEP not only introduced SBM but also included other investments such as textbooks, school buildings, and teacher training. Though they attempted to control for those non-SBM investments, their propensity score matching method faced a serious challenge because those investments are also endogenous as part of the intervention package. In this paper, SBM was the only major change experienced among schools in the sample.
Moreover, the current study differs from most of the earlier works that found little impact of SBM (or its variants) on students' test scores. There are several possible reasons. First, it is possible that non-TEEP schools have learned from SBM experiences accumulated in TEEP schools, which improved the efficiency of SBM implementation. Social learning and/or knowledge transfer could have occurred from TEEP to non-TEEP SBM schools. Second, the schools that received SBM grants in 2006 based on their improvement plans might have had critically binding constraints that hinder school performance (despite relatively more experienced principals and teachers). In such a circumstance, relaxing the constraints with the assistance of SBM grants could have significantly impacted test scores. Finally, the SBM schools might have felt political pressure to show better performance to the government, which, combined with better school governance, might have resulted in a rather large increase in test scores.
These can be alternative explanations for the relatively large estimates presented in this paper.
5 The Ramos administration, along with their medium-term development plan, Philippines 2000, identified reforms as the key to bridging social gaps and alleviating poverty. The objective of enhancing development through social reforms led to the formulation of the blueprint for social development in the Philippines, the Social Reform Agenda (SRA), marked as the first instance of social reforms in the history of the Philippines (Ramos 1995) . As a result of the initial success of the SRA, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 8425 in 1998, widely known as the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act (Republic of the Philippines, Congress 1998). 6 Although there were provinces not located adjacent to TEEP provinces (e.g., some provinces in Central Luzon, Bocol, and some parts of Mindanao), they were still partnered with TEEP provinces. 7 The analysis shows that schools with more experienced teachers are likely to be better prepared to propose improvement plans, and thus receive SBM grants earlier. 8 First, it is relatively easy for students to transfer across schools in the same city division. Second, teachers can also easily communicate with teachers who work in other schools in the same city division to learn how to prepare improvement plans. 9 The data show that no school received the grant in 2008. Crump et al. (2009). 12 Some elementary schools are incomplete (not offering all grades) and/or multi-grade (combining more than a grade). 13 This trimming procedure drops 623 observations. 14 Preliminary analyses show that, contrary to the initial conjecture, the change in test score was relatively large in [2006] [2007] , not in later periods, which implies that SBM had a rather immediate effect. 15 Double differencing without propensity score matching also gives qualitatively similar results. The impacts are estimated slightly smaller than those using propensity score matching, which implies that SBM grants were allocated to schools that performed relatively worse (despite the fact that they developed school improvement plans earlier than others). 16 This is equivalent to estimating π in the equation: y = β0 + β1SBM + τ1T2006 + τ2T2008 + δ(SBM×T2006 + 2.5×SBM×T2009) + πSBM×T2009 + u, where δ measures the difference in the time trends between the treatment and control and π estimates the SBM impact. Due to difficulty in constructing comparable school-level variables for 2004, especially teachers' salaries, the triple differencing estimation was executed without control variables. 17 Investments in classrooms and teachers during the period of 2005 to 2010 could be positively correlated with the initial shock to test score in 2005 (e.g., schools that performed well in NAT 2005 could receive more allocations from the government). In this case, the estimates in Table A2 and, therefore, the simulated changes of the pupilclassroom ratio and the pupil-teacher ratio are upwardly biased. Table 1 National Achievement Test Scores -Grade 6 Table 2 Logit: Determinants of SBM grant allocation 
